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The equity premium in a small open economy,  
and an application to Israel 
 
Eliezer Borenstein and David Elkayam 
 
     
Abstract 
 
In this paper we attempt to reproduce both the business cycle facts and the equity premium of 
the Israeli economy—an economy which is "typical" in the sense that investment is much more 
volatile than output (and consumption). We show that GHH preferences, which are quite 
common in RBC models of small open economies, are not suited for reproducing both the 
business cycle and the equity premium facts of a "typical" small open economy. We found that 
a way to progress is to "correct" the GHH preferences by adding some degree of wealth effect 
on labor supply. That is, by switching to the Jaimovich-Rebelo (2006) type of preferences. 
However, in this case we also need to add to the model some kind of limitations on labor 
supply (we used both real wage rigidity and habits in labor). Our main finding is that the use of 
Jaimovich-Rebelo preferences considerably improves the results relative to that achieved by 
GHH preferences. The reason for this is that the GHH preferences are characterized by a 
relatively high degree of substitutability between consumption and leisure and this moderates 
the volatility of the stochastic discount factor (SDF). By adding some degree of wealth effect 
we can achieve a significant increase in the volatility of the SDF, and hence an increase in the 
equity premium and in the volatility of investment. Following the relevant literature we used 
three shocks: to productivity, to government expenditure and to the world interest rate. Our 
analysis suggests that by adding one or more of two kinds of shocks: shocks to wealth and 
shocks to the real exchange rate – one can achieve a significant progress in reproducing both 
the business cycle facts and the equity premium.  
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  ויישום למשק הישראלי, פרמיית המניות במשק קטן ופתוח
 
 דוד אלקיים ואליעזר בורנשטיין
 
 
 תקציר
 
פרמיית המניות במשק בד בבד עם   הריאליבנייר זה אנו מנסים לשחזר את מאפייני מחזור העסקים
(. ומן הצריכה) שההשקעות בו תנודתיות בהרבה מן התוצר מובן זה ב"טיפוסי"משק שהנו , הישראלי
ם בניתוח מחזורי עסקים ריאליי מקובלת למדי האשר הינ, HHGפונקצית התועלת מסוג אנו מראים כי 
 לשחזור של מאפייני מחזור העסקים יחד עם פרמיית ה מתאימהאינ,  למשקים קטנים ופתוחים(CBR)
פונקצית " תיקון"ניתן לשפר את התוצאות באמצעות מצאנו כי . המניות במשק קטן ופתוח סטנדרטי
מעבר באמצעות זאת , הוספת מידה מסוימת של השפעת רכוש על היצע העבודהבכיוון התועלת 
במקרה זה עלינו להוסיף למודל גם , עם זאת. )6002( olebeR-hcivomiaJצית התועלת של פונקל
היצע הרגלים בקיום ריאלי והשכר של הקשיחות וספנו הנחה של ה)מגבלות מסוימות על היצע העבודה 
 משפר olebeR-hcivomiaJפונקצית התועלת של כי השימוש בהוא הממצא העיקרי שלנו (. עבודהה
הסיבה לכך היא שהעדפות . HHGעותי את התוצאות ביחס לאלו המושגות תחת העדפות באופן משמ
השפעה ממתנת על יש צריכה לפנאי ולכך ה מאופיינות במידה גבוהה יחסית של תחליפיות בין HHG
על ידי הוספת מידה מסוימת של השפעת רכוש על (. FDS)התנודתיות של מקדם ההיוון הסטוכסטי 
עלייה ניכרת מתקבלת ( היצע העבודהיכולת ההתאמה של עם מגבלות על ספת ובתו)היצע העבודה 
בעקבות . עלייה בפרמיית המניות ובתנודתיות של ההשקעותבעקבותיה ו, FDS –בתנודתיות של ה 
. ולשער הריבית העולמי, להוצאה הממשלתית, לפריון: הספרות הרלוונטית השתמשנו בשלושה זעזועים
שער לזעזועי רכוש וזעזוע : כך שעל ידי הוספת אחד או יותר משני סוגי זעזועיםמצביע על הניתוח שלנו 
ניתן להשיג שיפור ניכר ביכולת לשחזר את מאפייני מחזור העסקים יחד עם פרמיית , ריאליהחליפין ה
 .המניות
 
 
 3
1. Introduction 
A well known result in the business cycle–asset pricing literature is that the standard1 real 
business cycle (RBC) model is unable to reproduce the equity premium observed in the data.2 
In order to be able to produce a reasonable equity premium, there must be some real frictions 
in the real business cycle model which make it difficult for the consumer to fully and freely 
smooth marginal utility of consumption in response to external shocks.3  
Abel (1990) and Constantinides (1990) have shown that high risk aversion and high 
degree of habit formation in consumption can generate an equity premium in an endowment 
economy. Jermann (1998) extended the results to a production economy with endogenous 
capital but with constant labor input. The ability of the consumer-producer to freely adjust 
investment-savings in response to external shocks enables the consumer to smooth the 
marginal utility of consumption. In order to produce an equity premium in his set up, 
Jermann added capital adjustment costs to the production process of capital. The higher those 
adjustment costs are, the harder it is for the representative consumer-producer to adjust 
investment-savings in response to external (productivity) shocks. When one allows labor 
input to become endogenous in Jermann's standard RBC model, the equity premium usually 
disappears. The reason is that the consumer can adjust labor supply, in response to a 
productivity shock, and so to continue smoothing marginal utility of consumption. 
Endogenous labor supply and the existence of a relatively high wealth effect on labor 
supply, in the commonly used preferences in real business cycle models, often cause a 
countercyclical behavior of hours worked in the model, while in the data labor input tend to 
be pro-cyclical. This outcome, often found in the models, is the result of a positive wealth 
effect on labor supply. A negative productivity shock reduces income (and consumption). 
The consumer would like to compensate for this (to smooth marginal utility of consumption) 
by working more hours (increase labor supply). The result is often a small (or even negative) 
correlation between output (and consumption) and hours worked, while in the data this 
correlation is usually highly positive. 
Uhlig (2006, 2007) suggested overcoming the above two problems (countercyclical labor 
input and small equity premium) by adding the assumption of real wage rigidity to the model. 
                                                 
1
 By "standard" we mean a frictionless, one agent (homogenous) model such as the one presented by 
King, Plosser and Rebelo (2000).  
2
 For a survey see, for example, Cochrane (2001). 
3
 As is already known (for example Lettau and Uhlig (2002)) and will be discussed below, the shape 
of the utility function also has an important role in producing an equity premium. 
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In his set up, the labor market is always in a situation of excess supply and the quantity of 
labor is determined by the demand of firms. A positive productivity shock increases the 
demand for labor and if the shift (to the left) in the labor supply (wealth effect) is not too 
strong, then labor will continue to grow with output. That means that in such a situation the 
consumer does not have an effect on the quantity of labor (it is determined by demand only). 
In this set up, Uhlig showed that a sizeable equity premium can emerge in an otherwise 
standard RBC model.4 
The aforementioned literature dealt with closed economy models. When one moves to an 
open economy (such as the model of Mendoza (1991) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003)) 
another degree of freedom is added: consumers can adjust their external borrowing position. 
In order to produce an equity premium in such a set up, Parvar et al. (2012) added to the 
model adjustment costs for adjusting the external debt position of the consumer. They 
applied the model to the data of three South American countries (Brazil, Argentina and 
Chile) and succeeded in matching both the business cycle facts and the equity premium of 
those countries. (To the best of our—and their—knowledge, this is the only paper that tries to 
match business cycle moments and equity premium in a small open economy). 
Parvar et al. (2012) used a model with GHH5 preferences that is quite common in models 
of small open economies. An important characteristic of these preferences is the absence of a 
wealth affect on labor supply. This helps to reproduce the business cycle moments of an open 
economy without the need to "add" real wage rigidity. However, the business cycle facts of 
the above mentioned countries differ at least with one respect from the data of a typical small 
open economy. As can be seen in Table 3 of Parvar et al. (2012), in the above mentioned 
South American countries (and in the specific time period of their research6) the volatility of 
investment is quite similar to that of consumption.7 On the other hand, in our data (as well as 
in most small open economies8) the standard deviation of investment is significantly larger 
                                                 
4
 We can name at least two other ways to overcome the above two problems caused by endogenous 
labor supply (in a representative agent model). Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (2001) added friction to 
the labor market by specifying limited sectoral mobility. Jaccard (2010) added to the model internal 
habit formation in labor.    
5
 This function was first proposed by Greenwood, Hercowitz, Huffman, (1988). 
6
 Their research covers the period 1993 to 2007. 
7
 The standard deviation of investment and consumption is 5.56 and 4.73 percent respectively in 
Argentina. In Brazil, the numbers are 19.9 and 18.66, respectively, and in Chile 10.8 and 6.8. In 
Israel, the figures are 12.3 and 2.2, respectively.  
8
 For example: Canada, Portugal, Finland, Norway, Portugal and Belgium. In these countries the 
volatility of investments is more than 3 times the volatility of consumption. 
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than that of consumption9. As will be discussed later in this paper, it seems that the GHH 
utility used (by Parvar et al.) is not suited to reproduce both the business cycle and the equity 
premium facts of a "typical" small open economy.     
In this paper we are trying to reproduce both the business cycle facts and the equity 
premium of the Israeli economy, which is typical in the sense that investment is much more 
volatile than output (and consumption). Following Parvar et al. (2012), we started with the 
GHH utility. Using this function we found it difficult to reproduce both the business cycle 
facts and the equity premium of our data, which are quite similar to a typical small open 
economy. We found that a way to progress is to "correct" the GHH preferences by adding 
some degree of wealth effect on labor supply. We do this (as will be explained later) by 
switching to the Jaimovich-Rebelo (2006) type of preferences. However, in this case we also 
need to add to the model some kind of limitations on labor supply (we used both real wage 
rigidity, of the kind proposed by Uhlig (2006, 2007), and habits in labor). As we shall see 
later, the addition of some degree of wealth effect (and wage rigidity) can improve the fit 
even when we look only on the business cycle moments (i.e., ignoring the equity premium). 
Our main finding in this paper is that the use of Jaimovich-Rebelo (henceforth JR) 
preferences considerably improves the results relative to that achieved by GHH preferences. 
The reason for this, as will be detailed later, is that the GHH preferences are characterized by 
a relatively high degree of substitutability between consumption and leisure, and this 
moderates the volatility of the stochastic discount factor (SDF). By adding some degree of 
wealth effect we can get a significant increase in the volatility of the SDF, and hence an 
increase in the equity premium and in the volatility of investment.  
An intuitive explanation is as follows. Assume a negative technology shock which 
reduces consumption (and thus increases the marginal utility of consumption) and reduces 
the demand for labor. In both GHH and JR preferences, consumption and leisure are 
substitutable. In the GHH case the wealth effect on labor supply is zero—that is, the decline 
in labor moderates, to a large degree, the increase in the marginal utility of consumption, 
such that the consumer is not interested in increasing labor supply. In the case of JR 
preferences the wealth effect is positive—that is, the consumer wishes to increase labor 
supply in order to moderate the increase in the marginal utility of consumption. But, because 
of the existence of wage rigidity, he is prevented from doing so freely and this generates 
increased volatility of the marginal utility of consumption relative to the case of GHH.  
                                                 
9
 In fact, even for the above mentioned South American countries, if we look at a longer period then 
that used by Parvar et al. we see much more regular behavior of the business cycle moments. 
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In the model we used three shocks: to productivity, to government expenditure and to the 
world interest rate. An interesting finding of this paper is that additional shocks might make 
large contributions to the equity premium. As will be detailed later, this may include shocks 
to wealth and shocks to the real exchange rate.  
In the next section we present the model. In section 3 we present and discuss the data and 
in section 4 we discuss the calibration of the parameters. In section 5 we review in brief the 
relevant asset pricing equations. In section 6 we present and discuss the results and section 7 
concludes. Most of the technical aspects of the paper are left to the appendix.  
 
2. The model 
2.1 Households 
Following the relevant literature10 we assume a small open economy with infinite number of 
identical households. The representative household has the following momentary utility 
function:  
 
(1)     )~,~( 11 −− −−= thttctt HHCCUU χχ  
 
Where: tC  and tH  represent consumption and labor input of the representative household. 
We assume the existence of external habit formation both in consumption and in labor input. 
1
~
−tC  and 1
~
−tH  represent aggregate consumption and aggregate labor input and 0< cχ <1 and 
1< hχ <1  are parameters representing the degree of habit in consumption and in labor input. 
In each period the (representative) household faces a budget constraint that is represented 
by the following two equations: 
 
(2)     )]([)]([ 11 ottttttttkttt DDTBKKICKVHW −Θ++Γ+−Φ++=+ −−  
(3)     ttftt TBDRD −= −− 11  
 
The left hand side of equation (2) represents household current income, which is the sum 
of labor income and capital income, where tW  and 
k
tV  represent the wage rate and the rental 
rate of capital. The right hand side of the equation represents the uses of that income: 
consumption ( tC ), investment in physical capital ( tI ), lump sum taxes ( tΓ ), investment 
abroad (the trade balance) ( tTB ) and two special components: a cost of adjusting capital, 
)( 1−−Φ tt KK , and a cost of adjusting foreign assets ( ot DD −Θ( )). tK  and tD  are the capital 
                                                 
10
 In the specification of the model we follow Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe (2003). 
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stock and the foreign debt at the end of period t  (the beginning of period 1+t ), and Φ(.) and 
Θ(.) are concave cost functions. Equation (3) represents the evolution of foreign debt, where 
f
tR 1−  is the world (gross) interest rate at period t , which is determined at the end of 1−t . We 
assume that ftR 1−  is exogenous and stochastic. 
Equation (4) describes the evolution of the capital stock, where δ is depreciation rate. 
 
(4)     ttt IKK +−= −1)1( δ  
 
We substitute tTB  and tI  from (3) and (4) into (2). Households choose a process 
∞
=0},,,,,{ ttttttt DKIYHC  that maximizes lifetime expected utility:  
∑
∞
= −−
−−
0 110
),(
t t
h
tt
c
t
t HHCCUE χχβ
 
Subject to equation (2), where 0<β<1 is the rate of time preference.11 
Let tΛ  be the Lagrange multiplier on equation (2). The first order conditions of the 
maximization problem are equations (2) to (4) above and (5) to (8) ahead: 
(5)     ))(1(
)(
0
1
DD
ER
tD
tt
f
t
t
−Θ−
Λ
=Λ +
β
 
(6)     )~,~( 11 −− −−=Λ thttctct HHCCU χχ  
(7)     ttthttcth WHHCCU Λ=−−− −− )
~
,
~( 11 χχ  
(8)     ][ 11 ++ Λ=Λ teqttt REβ  
 
 Where: eqtR 1+  is the gross return on investing in capital stock and is given by: 
 
(9)     )(1
)()1(
1
11
1
−
++
+
−Φ+
−Φ+−+
=
ttk
ttk
k
teq
t KK
KKV
R
δ
  
 
The above first order conditions (equations (5) to (8)) are quite standard. Equation (6), 
the first order condition with respect to consumption, defines the shadow value of wealth 
( tΛ ) in terms of consumption.12 Equation (7) is the first order condition with respect to 
supply of labor. Equation (5) and (8) are the pricing equations for foreign bonds and stocks. 
                                                 
11
 The maximization is also subjected to a no-Ponzi constraint with respect to tD . 
12
 For ease of exposition we treat the utility function as time separable. In this case the derivative of 
lifetime utility is equal to that of the momentary utility. This is true for GHH or KPR preferences (see 
next section). For time non-separable preferences one should replace ()cU  in (6) by the derivative of 
lifetime utility with respect to tc .  
 8
That is, the inter-temporal Euler equations that describe the conditions that the returns on 
bonds and stocks need to satisfy. 
 
2.2 Firms 
We assume an infinite number of identical competitive firms. They are owned by households 
and produce a final good that is a perfect substitute to the foreign produced final good. The 
(representative) firm hires labor services and rents capital stock from households, to produce 
output tY , according to a Cobb-Douglas production function: 
(10)     )1(11 ),( αα −−− == ttttttt HKAHKFAY , 
Where tA  is the technology level. In each period the firm chooses tH  and 1−tK  to maximize 
its profits: ttt
k
tttt HWKVHKA −− −
−
− 1
)1(
1
α
 
The first order conditions are: 
(11)     
t
t
t
t
ttthtt H
Y
H
K
AHKFAW )1())(1(),( 11 αα α −=−== −−  
(12)    )()(),(
1
)1(1
1
−
−−
− ===
t
t
t
t
tttkt
k
t K
Y
H
K
AHKFAV αα α  
     
2.3 The driving forces 
Government consumption ( tG ) is assumed exogenous, stochastic, nonproductive and 
financed by lump-sum taxes. That is: 
(13)     ttG Γ=  
For the exogenous variables we assume the following AR(1) process: 
(14)     gttggt GGG ερρ ++−= −10 lnln)1(ln   
(15)     rtftfffft RRR ερρ ++−= −10 lnln)1(ln  
(16)     ttat AA ερ += −1lnln  
Where 0G  and
fR0 are steady state values. The innovations ( gtε , rtε , tε ) are assumed to be 
i.i.d variables, with variances g2σ , r2σ , 2σ , and are also not correlated with each other. 
For the cost functions )( 1−−Φ tt KK  and ot DD −Θ( ) we assume the following 
specification: 
(17)     211 )(5.0)( −− −=−Φ ttktt KKKK φ  
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(18)     21 )(5.0)( −−=−Θ ttdot DDDD φ  
To solve the model we need to specify an explicit utility function. The solution is a set of 
stochastic processes of the endogenous variables  
∞
=Γ 0},,,,,,,,{ ttktttttttt VWDKIYHC  and of the driving forces ∞=0},,{ ttftt ARG  satisfying 
equations (2)-(16) given equations (17)-(18) and the initial conditions for tt DK ,  and for the 
shocks gtε ,
r
tε , tε . 
    
2.4 The utility function  
For the utility function we shall use the specification that was suggested by Jaimovich-
Rebelo (2006):  
(20)     
c
tt
h
tt
c
t
t
h
tt
c
t
ch
XHHCCHHCCU
γ
χψχ
χχ
γγ
−
−−−−
=−−
−+
−−
−− 1
1})]~[()~{(),(
11
11
11  
Where 
(21)     γγχ −−−−= 1 11 )
~( ttctt XCCX  
cγ and hγ are curvature parameters13 and ψ is a scale parameter.  
The parameter 10 ≤≤ γ  governs the magnitude of the wealth elasticity of labor supply. As γ  
declines the (negative) income effect on labor supply declines (in absolute value). In the 
polar case of γ=0, the function gets the form of GHH utility which has the form:   
 
(20a)     
c
t
h
tt
c
t
t
h
tt
c
t
ch
HHCC
HHCCU
γ
χψχ
χχ
γγ
−
−−−−
=−−
−+
−−
−− 1
1])~[()~[(),(
11
11
11  
One of the characteristics of that function is that labor supply depends only on the real 
wage and is independent of the marginal utility of income (the income elasticity of labor 
supply is null). In the other polar case, when γ=1, the function gets the form of KPR14 utility:  
 
(20b)     
c
t
h
tt
c
t
t
h
tt
c
t
ch
HHCC
HHCCU
γ
χψχ
χχ
γγ
−
−−−−
=−−
−+
−−
−− 1
1]})~(1)[~{(),(
11
11
11  
Several papers have shown that a GHH utility function is more suited than the KPR 
function to reproduce the business cycles facts of a small open economy.15 As we shall see 
                                                 
13
 In the absence of consumption habits cγ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and in the 
absence of labor habits hγ  is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. 
14
  After King, Plosser, Rebelo,( 1988). 
15
 Correia et al. (1995), Uribe and Grohe (2003). 
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later, by increasing γ from 0 to about 0.05 we can do better (relative to GHH and KPR 
utilities) in reproducing the business cycle facts of the Israeli economy.  
Recently, Parvar et al. (2012) used a model with GHH preferences and successfully 
reproduced both the business cycles facts and the equity premium of several South American 
countries. However, the business cycle properties of those countries differ in several respects 
from our data.16 As can be seen in Table 3 of Parvar et al. (2012), in the South American 
countries (to which the paper refers), and during the specific period under study, the volatility 
of investment is similar to that of output.17 On the other hand, in our data (as well as in many 
small open economies) the standard deviation of investment is much larger than that of 
output and consumption. We shall refer to this issue later on and claim that it is not possible 
to reproduce both the business cycle facts and the equity premium of our data with a GHH 
utility. For that purpose we shall have to add some wealth effect by using the Jaimovich-
Rebelo type of utility (that is, increasing γ above zero).  
 
2.5 Adding real wage rigidity  
Preliminary simulations with Jaimovich-Rebelo preferences with a positive wealth effect 
(positiveγ ) produced a much lower correlation between output ( ty ) and labor ( th ) than in 
the data. This is a well known problem with this kind of utility function. To overcome this 
problem (and to be able to produce an equity premium, as will be detailed later) we followed 
Uhlig (2006, 2009) and added the assumption that the real wage is rigid. More specifically, 
we replaced the labor supply equation (7) with the following two equations: 
 
(22) (7′)   fttthttcth WHHCCU Λ=−−− −− )
~
,
~( 11 χχ  
(23) (7′′)   µµ 11)( −−= tftt WWW  
Where ftW stands for the frictionless real wage and 0≤µ≤1 is the degree of real wage rigidity. 
As has been shown by Uhlig (2006, 2009) and will be also demonstrated below, real wage 
rigidity can be an important source of the equity premium. 
     
                                                 
16
 Parvar et al (2010) used quarterly data for the years 1996 to 2007. We used yearly data for the 
period 1960 to 2008. 
17
  See footnotes 7 and 8. 
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3. Asset pricing 
3.1 The equity premium and the Sharpe ratio 
In this section we present the asset pricing equations that were used to calculate the equity 
premium and the Sharpe ratio18. 
Let )ln( tt Xx = be normally distributed, then: 
(24)     )var(5.0)())var(ln(5.0)ln()(ln ttttt xxEXXEXE +=+=      
The F.O.C for capital, equation (8) above can be written as: 
(25)     )(1 11 eqttt RME ++=    
Where: eqtR 1+  is the gross return on equity (capital) and 1+tM  is the S.D.F, that is: 
t
t
tM
Λ
Λ
= ++
1
1
β
. Taking logarithms and assuming that eqtR 1+  and 1+tM are log-normally 
distributed, we obtain, after a little bit of algebra (using equations (24) and (25)): 
(27)     ),()(ln)(ln 1111 ++++ −=+ teqtttteqtt mrCovMERE  
where: 2111 )]([)( +++ −= tttttt mEmEmVar  etc. 
For a risk free asset, the return at time t+1, ftR 1+ , is known at time t. Using this in the 
pricing equation (27), and using the fact that 
0)( 1 =+ftt rVar And 0),( 11 =++ tftt mrCov , we get the pricing equation for a risk free asset: 
(28)     )(ln 11 ++ −= ttft MEr  
 From (27) and (28) we get the following condition for the equity risk premium: 
(29)     ),()(ln 1111 ++++ −=−= teqttfteqttt mrCovrREEP  
Now, observe that: 1111 lnln)ln( ++++ ∆+=−+=
Λ
Λ
= ttt
t
t
tm λβλλβ
β
     
Using this in (28) we have: 
(30)     )(5.0)(ln 111 +++ ∆−∆−−= ttttft VarEr λλβ  
 
Note also that: 
)())((
))(())(()(
1
2
11
2
11
2
111
+++
+++++
=−
=−−−=∆−∆=∆
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 The material of this section is based on Uhlig (2006). For more detailed derivation see the 
appendix.   
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Using this in (29) we get: 
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and the Sharpe ratio is 
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To ease the calculation of the EP and SR from the outcomes of a log-linearized DSGE 
model, note that for each variable 1+tX : 
)ln(ln)(ln 011 XXVarXVar tttt −= ++  etc., where: 0X  is the steady state value of X .  
 
3.2 The equity premium and the Sharpe ratio in terms of the elasticities of the marginal 
utility  
Log linearization of the F.O.C (6) above yields: 
(33)(6′)     )~()~( 1,1 −− −+−−= ththchtctcct hhcc χηχηλ  
where: 
0|
0|0
c
cc
cc U
UC
−=η  and 
0|
0|0
,
c
ch
hch U
UH
=η  
Substitute tλ  from (33) in (31) we get: 
(35)(31′)      
)()(),()()(),(
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1111,1111
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−=
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eq
ttt
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For the equity premium;  
And for the Sharpe ratio we have 
(36)(32′)     )(),()(),( 111,111 ++++++ −= ttteqtthchttteqttcct hhrccrSR σρησρη .     
In appendix A.4 we present the detailed calculation of ccη and hch,η for the case of JR, GHH 
and KPR preferences.  
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4. The data 
For the calibration and for the empirical moments we used the following data: 
National Accounts    
We use yearly data for the period 1960 to 2008 on gross domestic product (Y), private 
consumption excluding durables (C),19 gross domestic investments (I), government 
consumption (excluding direct defense imports) (G) and trade balance (TB) to output ratio 
(TBY)20. All series are in terms of fixed prices and per capita. For the analysis we expressed 
the variables in terms of percentage deviations from HP trend. 
 
Wages and Labor 
For labor we used the number of total employees (per capita) multiplied by the average 
working hours per employee (i.e., total hours worked per capita). For wage we used the 
averaged monthly wage per employee post, deflated by the CPI. Both series are expressed in 
terms of percentage deviations from an HP trend. 
Graph 1 presents the behavior of the main components of the national accounts variables 
during the period 1960 to 2008. As can be seen, consumption's volatility is quite similar to 
GDP's volatility, whereas Investment's volatility is much higher. Another noticeable fact is 
the high positive correlation between Labor and GDP (that is, labor is pro-cyclical).   
                                                 
19
 We also checked the series of total private consumption and report its statistics in the relevant 
tables.   
20
 The trade balance (TB) was calculated as the difference between the GDP and the sum of the three 
uses: private consumption, government consumption and gross domestic investments, 
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Graph 1: Behavior of main National Accounts data during 1960 to 2008 
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Financial Data 
For the foreign risk free rate, we used monthly data (for 1954–2009) on the nominal yield to 
maturity on one-year US Treasury bills. We subtracted actual annual inflation (i.e., in the last 
twelve months) from the nominal yield and then the data were yearly averaged. For the 
domestic risk free asset, we used data (for 1966–2009) on the yield to maturity on one-year 
Israeli government CPI indexed bonds.21  
For the domestic stocks we used monthly data (for 1971–2010) on the real total return on 
stocks. As another alternative to the holding of a risk free asset, we also used data on the real 
total return on the whole portfolio of government indexed bonds (for 1976–2010).  
Table 1 summarizes the main asset pricing facts for the Israeli economy during the years 
1971 to 2010. During that period, the average yearly real return on stocks was 12.73 percent, 
while the real return on one year governments bonds was 3.34 percent. That is, we observe 
an average equity premium of 9.39 percent per year, which is quite in line with what is 
observed in other countries. We should also note the very high volatility of the yearly rate of 
return on stocks, 35.06 percent, which is by far larger than that observed in other countries. 
Note that the equity premium is quite stable during most of the period (in 2000-2010 it 
seemed to decline due to a decline in stocks return). Due to the very large volatility of stocks' 
return the Sharpe ratio (SR) is relatively low, about 0.26 compared to a figure of about 0.50 
in US.  
Graph 2 presents the value of the two following portfolios: The first, represented by the 
lower line, is composed of government indexed bonds. The second, represented by the upper 
line, is composed of stocks. Both portfolios were scaled to 100 in 1976 (the beginning of our 
risk free bond data). As is clear from the graph, the value of the stock portfolio is much more 
volatile than the bond portfolio, and its growth was much higher—while the "risk free" 
portfolio's value grew by 60%, the value of the stock portfolio grew by more than 1000%. 
This graph offers a good visual presentation of the basic risk-return tradeoff: for higher 
returns one has to bear higher risks. 
                                                 
21
  Constructed from various sources.  
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Table 1 – Real return on stocks and bonds in the Israeli economy, 1971–2010 
 
 Equity total return Yield to maturity of  
a 1-year indexed 
government bond 
Total real return on 
a portfolio of indexed 
bonds 
Period Mean Standard 
deviation 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
1971–2010 12.73 35.06 3.34 2.69   
1977–2010 13.63 35.07 2.88 2.51 1.62 5.98 
1987–2010 13.27 33.39 3.17 2.27 3.54 4.99 
1992–2010 13.12 35.74 3.68 2.07 3.36 4.59 
2000–2010 10.60 34.61 3.22 2.35 4.84 4.98 
 
 
 
Graph 2: Asset pricing facts of the Israeli economy – 1970–2010 
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5. Calibration 
We first refer to the calibration of the model under the GHH preferences. Later we will 
present the changes made under Jaimovich-Rebelo preferences. 
We need to calibrate the following list of parameters:      
{ cγ , hγ ,ψ , cχ , hχ , β ,α ,δ , 0R , rρ , gρ , rσ , gσ , gs , tbs , ρ ,σ , kφ , dθ , µ } 
In doing so we followed a similar strategy to that of Parvar et al. (2012). We divided the 
parameters of the model into three groups. 
The first group contains the parameters of the utility function: { cγ , hγ , ψ , cχ , hχ , β }. 
We do not have a strong a priori knowledge of the values of the curvatures cγ  and hγ and on 
the habits parameters cχ  and hχ . We started with values that are common in the relevant 
literature and performed sensitivity checks. Thus, for the curvature parameter on 
consumption, cγ , we used three values: 1, 2 and 5, and eventually we chose 5. For the 
curvature on employment, hγ , we checked several values in the range of 0.5-2, and we chose 
0.9 eventually22 in order to get the volatility of labor close to the data. For the habit in 
consumption and in labor we tried 0, 0.4 and 0.6 and eventually we chose 0.6 for both. The 
labor parameter ψ was chosen such that the steady state value of labor is the same as in 
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003)23 (note that ψ depends also on the habits coefficients). β  is 
set to fulfill the steady state relation: 01 R=β . 
The second group includes parameters that we calibrated using historical data. This group 
contains: {α ,δ , 0R , rρ , gρ , rσ , gσ , gs , tbs , µ }. 
α−1 , the share of labor in national income, is set at 0.67, based on National Accounts 
data. To estimate parameters of the world interest rate ( rρ , rσ ) we used yearly data (for the 
years 1954 to 2009) on the real yield to maturity on one-year US Treasury bills (details in 
appendix). The estimates are 0.695 and 0.0137 for rρ and rσ  respectively. For the steady 
                                                 
22
 In the absence of habit in labor this means a Frisch elasticity of 1.1. 
23
 In their paper they have a steady state value of 1.00742 for labor. Correia et al. (1995) applied the 
following methodology to calibrate the steady state value of h: they assumed that there are 7×14=98 
potential working hours in a week and that average work week is 40 hours. Multiplying this by the 
employment rate yields a value for the steady state of H . In Israel, the sample average of the 
employment rate is 0.56. So applying this methodology to Israel yields: 
23.098/40*56.00 ==H . However, using this value caused us problems in the solution of the 
model when the risk aversion and habit parameters took high values. Therefore, we decided to stay 
with the Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe calibration. 
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state risk free rate )1( 0 −R  we used the sample mean of real yield to maturity on a one-year 
Israeli government bond (0.03324). We set: 1.0=δ , which is quite close to what is derived 
from the sample mean of the ratio of investment to output.25 
The parameters gρ  and gσ were estimated using an auto-regression of the H.P. filtered 
deviations of government consumption, for the period 1980 to 2008.26 To estimate gs , the 
government consumption share in output, we used the sample for that period.27  
For 
tbs , the trade balance share of output, we used the sample mean in the period 1960 to 
2008, and got value of -0.048.28  
As for the parameter µ  (wage rigidity), we first tried to estimate it by a regression based 
on data of real wage, consumption and employment (all in terms of deviations from H.P 
trend). The log linearized version of equations (20) and (21) is29: 
 
(39) (7''')     ))(())(( 1,1, −− −++−−= tctchcccththchhhft cchhw χηηχηη  
(40)(7′′′)     1)1( −+−= tftt www µµ  
 
Plugging ftw from (39) into (40) we get:  
(41)     11,1, ))()(1())()(1( −−− +−+−+−−−= ttctchcccththchhht wcchhw µχηηµχηηµ  
                                                 
24
 Another possibility is to use the mean of the sample in terms of U.S data (which happens to be 
0.017). We prefer to base the estimate of 10 −R  on Israeli data. The difference (0.033-0.017) can be 
interpreted as a "constant" risk premium. 
25
 In steady state (ignoring growth) we have:  
254.0
103.0
1.0*33.0
100
0 =
+
=
+−
=
δ
αδ
RY
I .  
In the data, if investment includes durables consumption goods, the average investment output ratio is 
0.246 (without durables goods the ratio is 0.215). 
26
 We shortened the period because of major change that took place in the process for government 
consumption. 
27
 The value in the data was 0.31. We used a value a bit lower, 0.28, since it performed better in the 
model solution, due to numerical issues. 
28
 Since we also wanted to calibrate the debt to GDP ratio to be similar to the data (around 0.2), we 
slightly modified eq. 3 such that the debt evolvement is determined by the current account and not the 
trade balance by itself. The ratio of current account to GDP was calibrated such that the steady state 
value of debt to GDP will equal 0.2.  
29
 For the GHH (39) takes the form: ttth
h
cwh ⋅−=
−
0)1( χ
γ
 and for the KPR we have:  
ttth
h
cwh
Z
Z
⋅−=
−−
+ 1)1)(1( 0
0
χ
γ
where 
h
HZ h γχψ +−= 100 ])1[(  for details see appendix A4.  
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Using the calibrated values for hc χχ ,  in (41) we can estimate µ in (41). We estimated (41)     
by OLS and by 2SLS30; in both cases the estimates were close to 0.76. For the calibration we 
used a slightly higher value, 0.85.  
 
Table 2: Calibrated and estimated parameters 
Parameter cγ  hγ  cχ  hχ  β 
Final value 5 0.5 0.6 0.6 01 R  
Sensitivity 1,2,5 2,1,0.5 0,0.4,0.6     0,0.4, 0.6 
 
 
Parameter α  δ  0R  rρ  gρ  rσ  gσ  gs  tbs  µ  
Value 0.33 0.1 1.033 0.695 0.248 0.0137 0.0147   0.28 -0.048 0.85 
 
The third group contains five parameters { ρ , σ , kφ , dθ , γ }. To find the value of 
those parameters, we conducted a grid search on the first four, for various values of γ  (as 
will be detailed in the next section). In the grid search we tried to match the following ten 
moments: standard deviation of output ( yσ ), standard deviation of consumption ( cσ ), 
standard deviation of investments ( iσ ), standard deviation of labor input ( hσ ), standard 
deviation of trade-balance to output ratio ( tbyσ ), first order auto-correlation of output 
(
1, −tyy
ρ ), labor-output correlation ( yh ,ρ ), investment-output correlation ( yi ,ρ ), trade-balance 
to output ratio-output correlation ( ytby ,ρ ) and mean equity premium (EP). Specifically, we 
searched for the parameters that minimize a loss function composed of the square distance 
between the simulated moments and the moments in the data.31 
We conducted the grid search under two alternatives. In the first, alternative 1, we looked 
only at the business cycle aspect of the model. That is, we excluded the equity premium from 
the loss function. In the second alternative, alternative 2, we added the equity premium to the 
loss with a weight of 0.5 (i.e., we assigned a 50 percent weight to the real business cycle 
moments and a 50 percent weight to the equity premium). The calibrated values of the first 
and the second group of parameters are listed in Table 2.  
 
 
                                                 
30
 We used the following instruments: 323232 ,,,,, −−−−−− tttttt hhccww , for the period 1986-2008.    
31
 For details see appendix A.6. 
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6. Results  
In the first subsection we will present the main results. In the second we shall expand on the 
explanations. In the third subsection we shall refer to the role of the government expenditure 
shock and to the potential role of other wealth shocks. In the fourth subsection we shall refer 
to the potential role of shock to the real exchange rate.  
    
6.1 Main results 
In Table 3 we present the results obtained under various values of γ , between 0 and 1. In the 
first column of Table 3 we present the relevant moments of the Israeli data. Apart from the 
first column, the table contains four additional blocks and each block contains two columns. 
In the first column of each block (labeled "No EP") we present the results obtained when we 
consider only the business cycle aspect of the data (i.e., ignoring the risk premium in the loss 
function; we also refer to that alternative as "alternative 1"). In the second column of each 
block (labeled "EP") we present the results when the equity premium is added to the loss 
function (we also refer to that alternative as "alternative 2"). The last two rows of each 
column in blocks 1 to 4 in Table 3 contain the value of the loss function calculated with the 
relevant parameters. The first row, labeled "No EP" presents the loss when the equity 
premium is absent from the loss function. The second row, labeled "EP", presents the loss 
when the equity premium is included in the loss function. In each column we present also the 
optimum values of the four "searched by grid" parameters ( kφ , dθ , ρ , σ ).    
In block 1 we present the results under GHH preferences (that is, under 0=γ ). Looking 
at the first column of block 1 we can see that most of the moments are quite close to the data. 
This is not surprising since GHH preferences are known to provide successful replication of 
the business cycle moments of a "typical" small open economy.32 The equity premium under 
this alternative is 0. When we move to alternative 2—that is, we add a 9 percent equity 
premium to the loss function with a weight of 50 percent—we achieve a large, close to data, 
equity premium (8.87) but the business cycle "fit" is worsened considerably.33 The value of 
the loss function in this case is 0.1035. As can be seen, in order to achieve a large equity 
premium, kφ  and dφ  must increase considerably. The "price" is a large reduction in the 
                                                 
32
 Correia et al. (1995) and Uribe-Grohe (2003).    
33
 The value of the loss function of alternative 1, with the searched by grid parameters of alternative 2 
is 0.2069 compared to a value of 0.0510 achieved with the parameters of alternative 1 (that is it is 4 
times bigger) .  
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standard deviations of i  and of ytb / . The standard deviation of investment reduced to 3.6, 
from a value of 10.6 under alternative 1 (where in the data the relevant number is 12.3) and 
the standard deviation of the trade balance to output ratio declines to 0.4 from a value of 2.4 
under alternative 1 (where in the data the relevant number is 2.6). This is not a surprising 
result. In order to reproduce an equity premium in a standard RBC model we need to "add" 
significant real rigidities. A larger value of kφ means a larger cost of adjusting the capital 
stock and this makes it difficult for the producer-consumer to smooth the marginal utility of 
consumption in response to external shocks. Similarly, a large value of dφ  means a large cost 
of adjusting the external borrowing position for the producer-consumer when he tries to 
smooth the marginal utility of consumption in response to shocks.  
As will be detailed below, it seems that this result (the large reduction of the standard 
deviation of investment) is general in the sense that GHH preferences are not so suitable for 
replicating both the business cycle and the equity premium of a typical small open economy. 
We found that adding some wealth effect to labor supply, (that is, to increase γ above zero) 
helps substantially in matching the data.  
 Block 2 presents the results when 05.0=γ . This value yielded the lowest loss (0.0733 
under alternative 2). Comparing the results of alternative 2 in blocks (2) and (1) we see that 
increasing γ  (from 0 to 0.05) enables us to achieve a similar equity premium but with a 
much better fit of the business cycle moments. We see an improvement in the standard 
deviations of y , c , i  and h  and in the ratio of the standard deviation of c , i , and h  relative 
to that of y . Notice also that the ratio of the standard deviation of i  to c  increased from 
about 1.13 (3.6/3.2 in block 1, to about 3.1 (8.0/2.6) in block 2 (which is still, however, lower 
than the ratio of 5.6 (12.3/2.2) in the data). In the next subsection we shall expand on the 
causes of this improvement. 
When we compare the results of alternative 1 in blocks (2) and (1) we see that the results 
under 05.0=γ  are better than those achieved using the GHH preferences (the loss reduced 
from 0.0510 to 0.0175). That is, at least in our calibration, even when we concentrate only on 
the business cycle moments we can substantially improve the fit by increasingγ . We can see 
an improvement in the standard deviation of output, consumption and investments and in the 
ratio between them (that is, in the ratio of the standard deviation of consumption and 
investment relative to that of income). Note also the improvement of the correlation of i  and 
h  with y . In blocks 3 and 4 we present the results when we get closer to KPR preferences 
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( 50.0=γ  and 99.0=γ ). As can be seen, under both alternatives there is an increase in the 
loss (i.e., the fit worsens) the closer we are to the KPR preferences. Comparing the results to 
the GHH preferences we see that when 99.0=γ , that is, we are very close to KPR 
preferences, the loss under alternative 1 is lower than in the GHH case, whereas under 
alternative 2 it is higher. 
 It should be noted that in all of the cases, when we search for an equity premium, f
r
σ , 
the standard deviation of the risk free interest rate is very high compared to its standard 
deviation in the data (2.7%). This is known as the risk free rate volatility puzzle and is a 
feature of many DSGE models. Parvar et al. (2012) claim that their model does not present 
this problem since the risk free rate according to them is pinned down by the world's interest 
rate which is not very volatile, and yet the equity premium is high enough because the debt 
adjustment costs cause the IMRS to become volatile enough. In our view, the correct interest 
rate that should be considered as the risk free rate, and the one that should be compared to the 
data, is the one taking into account the adjustment costs of borrowing and lending from 
abroad (i.e., the effective risk free interest rate). This effective risk free interest rate is the one 
we present in our tables, and it is calculated as follows: 
))(1( 0DD
R
r
tD
f
tef
t
−Θ−
=
.  
When deciding whether to invest in a local bond or in a foreign bond, the investor will take 
into account the adjustment costs incurred by changing the foreign debt position. Therefore, a 
no-arbitrage condition will equate the expected return on the local bond with eftr . In the data, 
the standard deviation of the local bond is 2.7%. The standard deviation of eftr when 
05.0=γ  is much higher, 24%. Thus, as can be seen, we are not able to get over the risk 
free rate volatility puzzle in any of the cases. This problem remains in the next sections as 
well. 
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Table 3: Business cycle moments and the equity premium,  
Israeli data and the model under the Jaimovich-Rebelo utility function 
 
Table 3a presents a decomposition of the equity premium to its components. The upper 
part of Table 3a ("Total") presents the decomposition of the equity premium under each 
alternative, according to equation 35 in the text. It should be noted that ccη and hch,η  are not a 
function of the parameters that we searched over, but ),( 11 ++ teqtt crCov and ),( 11 ++ teqtt hrCov  do 
depend on those parameters.  
The table indicates several points. First, when we compare alternatives 1 and 2 (in each 
block) we see that there is a difference in the covariance of consumption and labor with the 
 
γ
 
 (1) 
 
0.0001 
(2) 
 
0.05 
(3) 
 
0.5 
(4) 
 
0.99 
  
Data 
Israel No EP EP No EP EP No EP EP No EP EP 
Standard 
deviations              
Y 2.9 2.8 2.4 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.1 3.4 3.1 
C 2.2  2.9 3.2 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.9 2.2 3.6 
I 12.3 10.6 3.6 11.9 8.0 12.5 6.8 13.4 5.4 
H 2.8 1.9 1.7 2.3 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.3 1.1 
Tb/y 2.6  2.4 0.4 2.4 0.4 2.4 0.4 2.4 0.4 
Serial 
correlations 
 32 32.00 32.00 32.00 32.00 32.00 32.00 32.00 
Y 0.61 0.6 0.46 0.60 0.39 0.53 0.29 0.54 0.23 
Correlations 
with output 
         
C 0.51 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.97 0.99 0.98 0.95 0.98 
I 0.71 0.42 0.91 0.57 0.95 0.61 0.96 0.67 0.96 
H 0.71 0.98 0.98 0.86 0.51 0.87 0.61 0.83 0.82 
tb/y 
-0.08 0.14 0.26 0.14 0.42 0.13 0.38 0.12 0.37 
Equity 
premium 
 32.0 32.00   32.00 32.00 32.00 32.00 
EP 9.00 0.00 8.87 0.01 8.95 0.01 8.89 0.01 8.59 
ef
r
σ  
 0.24 29.96 0.39 23.93 0.35 29.37 0.40 32.74 
SR 
 0.01 0.21 0.01 0.24 0.01 0.21 0.01 0.19 
Parameter 
Values 
         
dθ  
 0.36 6.8E+05 0.363 6.8E+05 0.357 2.0E+07 0.354 1.1E+11 
kφ  
 6.7E-06 26.790 2.1E-11 10.908 1.1E-10 11.874 1.9E-11 14.588 
ρ  
 0.22 0.29 0.44 0.50 0.44 0.40 0.38 0.24 
σ  
 0.0101 0.0103 0.0114 0.0195 0.0152 0.0213 0.0196 0.0235 
Loss function 
value 
 32 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 
No EP  0.0510 0.2069 0.0175 0.1466 0.0251 0.1747 0.0425 0.2478 
EP   0.5250 0.1035 0.5081 0.0733 0.5118 0.0874 0.5203 0.1249 
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return on equity. The higher equity premium under the "EP" alternatives is achieved through 
an increase in the covariance between consumption and the return on equity. For example, 
under alternative 2 in the first block, the equity premium is achieved by increasing the 
covariance between consumption and the return on equity from 0.01 (in alternative 1) to 0.76 
(in alternative 2). 
Second, the increase in the covariance between consumption and the return on equity is 
accompanied by a large increase also in the covariance between labor and the return on 
equity, which has a negative contribution to the equity premium, and this component 
moderates the positive contribution of the former component.  
Third, when moving from γ = 0.001 ("GHH") to γ = 0.05, both ccη and hch,η  fall. 
However, hch,η  falls relatively much more than ccη and this helps to achieve the equity 
premium. We shall return to this point soon when we shall review the sources of the better 
results obtained under JR preferences.  
The rest of the table presents the contribution of each shock to the total equity premium 
and to the covariances. It is clear that the biggest source of the equity premium is the 
technology shock ("eps"), accounting for an equity premium of 7.67 percent, out of a total 
value of 8.87, in the GHH case, for example.  
It is also clear that the shock to the world interest rate ("epsrw"), does not contribute at all 
to the equity premium and to the covariances. This happens because the change in the world 
interest rate is not sufficient to generate a strong response of eqr 34, which thus stays almost 
stable.    
The government shock ("epsg") contributes a small part of the equity premium (1.2 
percent in the GHH case). However, note that this contribution (1.2 percent) is associated 
with a very low covariance of c and eqr (in the GHH case: 0.03 percent, as opposed to 0.76 of 
the technology shock) and also with a very low covariance of h and eqr . When we increase 
γ  this covariance even becomes negative, which means a positive contribution to the equity 
premium. This suggests that large government shocks, and in general, expenditure or wealth 
shocks, may have a relatively strong effect on the equity premium. This point will be 
elaborated in subsection 6.3. 
                                                 
34
 This outcome depends on the value of dφ . If it is small enough, the reaction of eqr could be 
stronger, thus having a bigger influence on the equity premium and the covariance. 
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Table 3a: The equity premium and its sources under Jaimovich-Rebelo preferences 
),(),( 11,11 ++++ −= teqtthchteqttcct hrCovcrCovEP ηη  
 
 
γ
 
(1) 
 
0.0001 
(2) 
 
0.05 
(3) 
 
0.5 
(4) 
 
0.99 
  No EP EP No EP EP No EP EP No EP EP 
Total 
            
eta_cc 38.75 38.75 29.17 29.17 20.48 20.48 12.63 12.63 
eta_ch,h 49.85 49.85 26.78 26.78 20.11 20.11 13.06 13.06 
cov(c,r) 0.01 0.76 0.01 0.58 0.01 0.76 0.01 0.95 
cov(h,r) 0.00 0.41 0.01 0.31 0.01 0.34 0.00 0.27 
Equity premium % 0.00 8.87 0.01 8.95 0.01 8.89 0.01 8.59 
 
        
eps 
        
cov(c,r) 0.01 0.59 0.01 0.77 0.01 0.95 0.01 0.59 
cov(h,r) 0.01 0.33 0.01 0.35 0.00 0.27 0.01 0.33 
Equity premium  % 0.00 7.67 0.01 8.40 0.01 8.67 0.01 8.38 
 
        
  
        
epsrw 
        
cov(c,r) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
cov(h,r) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Equity premium % 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
        
  
        
epsg 
        
cov(c,r) 0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
cov(h,r) 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
Equity premium % 0.00 1.20 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.21 
         
 
        
 
*  The shocks' contributions to the general equity premium don't always add up exactly to 100% due to 
approximations.  
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6.2 Moving from GHH to JR preferences: the sources of improvement in the loss 
function   
 
Table 4 helps in isolating the sources of the improvement in the loss function when moving 
from GHH preferences to JR preferences. Column 1 of Table 4 presents the results of the 
optimization in the case of GHH when looking for an equity premium (it is the same as the 
EP alternative in the first block of Table 3). As noted earlier, the biggest drawback of the 
results under the GHH preferences is the very low (absolute and relative) standard deviation 
of investments (3.6% as opposed to 12.3% in the data, and a ratio of 1.125 between the 
standard deviations of investments and consumption, as opposed to 5.6 in the data). When 
moving to the JR preferences, under γ = 0.05 (column 4 in Table 4) we get an improvement 
in the loss function value - from a loss of 0.1035 under GHH preferences, to a value of 
0.0733 under γ = 0.05. It seems that the most noticeable difference in the γ = 0.05 case is 
the standard deviation of investments which is higher both in absolute value, 8.0 percent, and 
relative to the standard deviation of consumption, 3.1 (also due to a small reduction in the 
standard deviation of consumption).  
As we see, the move to JR preferences helps in raising the absolute and relative standard 
deviation of investments without having to compromise on the equity premium. Note that 
one of the causes of the low standard deviation of investments under the GHH case is the 
high level of capital adjustment costs ( kφ ), 26.79. Under γ = 0.05 kφ  is much lower, 
10.908, which may explain part of the larger volatility of investments.  
To assess the contribution of the reduction in kφ  we performed a simulation under the 
GHH preferences, using the same parameter values of column 1 except of kφ , for which we 
used a value of 10.908 (The value found optimal under γ = 0.05). The results which are 
presented in block 2 of Table 4 show that the standard deviation of investments goes up a 
little, to 4.5 percent, while mildly lowering the standard deviation of consumption, resulting 
in a small improvement of the relative volatility of investments to consumption's volatility, 
1.5. Hence the lower value of kφ , explains only a small part of the improvement in the loss 
function value. The equity premium in this case declines sharply to 2.39 percent. Block 3 
presents the results of running the simulation with the same parameters of block 2, while 
changing γ to 0.05. It can be seen that now we observe a much better relative volatility of 
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investments, 3.1.35 Block 4 presents (again) the results of the optimal parameter values 
for γ = 0.05, where the optimal ρ  and σ were found to be higher. The relative volatility of 
investments stays the same, but the higher standard deviation and persistence of the 
technology shock raises the absolute standard deviations of all of the variables, thus getting 
the moments much closer to those in the data. 
 
Table 4: Moving from GHH to the Jaimovich-Rebelo utility function:   
The sources of improvement in the loss function 
  
  
  
                                                 
35
 This ratio is very close to the ratio in most of the small open economies we've examined (see 
footnote 8 for details).  
 
γ
 Data Israel 
(1) 
 
0.0001 
(2) 
 
0.0001 
(3) 
 
0.05 
(4) 
 
0.05 
Standard 
deviations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
y 2.9 2.4 2.5 1.6 3.3 
c 2.2 3.2 3.0 1.3 2.6 
i 12.3 3.6 4.5 4.0 8.0 
h 2.8 1.7 1.7 1.2 2.2 
tb/y 2.6 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Serial 
correlations 
     
y 0.61 0.5 0.54 0.21 0.39 
Correlations 
with output 
     
c 0.51 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.97 
i 0.71 0.91 0.92 0.84 0.95 
h 0.71 0.98 0.98 0.65 0.51 
tb/y 
-0.08 0.26 0.26 0.31 0.42 
Equity premium 
     
EP 9.00 8.87 2.39 2.49 8.95 
ef
r
σ   29.96 13.74 15.73 23.93 
SR  0.21 0.12 0.11 0.24 
Parameter 
Values 
 
   
 
dθ  
 
680801 680801 680801 680801 
kφ   26.790 10.908 10.908 10.908 
ρ   0.29 0.29 0.29 0.50 
σ   0.01 0.01 0.01 0.0195 
Loss function 
value 
 
32 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 
No EP  0.2069 0.1825 0.2458 0.1466 
EP  0.1035 0.3610 0.3845 0.0733 
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To understand how the move to JR preferences helps in raising the relative volatility of 
investments it is useful to examine the IRF of the model. Figure 1 presents the IRF of a 
negative technology shock (with a size of a one standard deviation) for selected variables,     
under the GHH preferences (in the red line) and under the JR preferences (when γ = 0.05, in 
the blue line). The parameter values used to calculate the presented IRF are the same as those 
that were used to construct the optimal results for the GHH utility function (Alternative 2 in 
block 1 of Table 3). That is, changes in the results for theγ = 0.05 case are only due to the 
change in γ . 
 
Figure 1 – IRF: A negative technology shock 
 
 
 
Let us look first at the GHH case (the red line). A negative technology shock lowers the 
firms' demand for labor. If the labor supply of households doesn't change (as in the GHH 
case), the lower demand results in a decline in the amount of labor ( h ), which, together with 
the decline in productivity, causes a fall in output ( y ). The lower output causes households 
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to reduce both consumption (c ) and investment ( i ).36 The fall in the demand for 
investments together with the fall of productivity lowers the return on capital ( eqr ). At the 
same time, the decline in consumption causes the marginal utility of consumption (λ ) to go 
up, thus causing a negative correlation between λ  and eqr which generates a positive equity 
premium.  
In the case of JR preferences (the blue line), in response to the negative productivity 
shock, households increase their labor supply (a wealth effect) and this moderates the decline 
in labor and thus also in output (relative to the GHH case). This results in a weaker fall of 
consumption, relative to the GHH case. Investments, however, fall roughly the same as in the 
GHH case37, resulting in a quite similar fall of the return on capital. 
In regard to the equity premium, note that the marginal utility of consumption (λ ) 
increases in the JR case the same as in the GHH, even though the level of consumption falls 
less. This happens because of the higher level of labor38, but also because of the lower value 
of hch,η
39
, that, as was noted earlier, falls relatively stronger than .
cc
η  Sinceλ and eqr react 
about the same as in the GHH case, the equity premium under both cases is similar. Hence, a 
small increase ofγ , to 0.05, generates a similar equity premium, with a much higher 
volatility of investments relative to consumption.   
 
6.2.1 The role of wage rigidity 
In the following we shall demonstrate that the role of the wage rigidity in reproducing the 
equity premium in the GHH case is negligible. On the other hand in the JR preferences it has 
a central role. More specifically, what matters is the interaction of the wealth effect on labor 
supply and the limitation on free adjustment of labor (caused by wage rigidity) which 
generates the equity premium.    
                                                 
36
 The demand for investments falls because households don't want consumption to fall too much, and 
also because the productivity of capital makes investment less profitable.  
37
 This is because of two offsetting effects: Households want to consume more in the JR case, and this 
should make investment fall even further than in the GHH case. Yet at the same time, since the 
amount of labor is higher in the JR case, the expected marginal productivity of capital ( mpk ) is 
higher, thus making investments more desirable. As mentioned, the net outcome of these two 
channels is close to zero (under the specific parameters used in this case), 
38
 Which is by itself also a result of the lower value of hch,η .   
39
 Recall that )~()~( 1,1 −− −+−−= ththchtctcct hhcc χηχηλ , so that a lower value of  hch,η  makes λ  
higher.  
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To illuminate the role of the wage rigidity, we plot the IRF of a negative technology 
shock for both of the cases presented in Figure 1, compared to the same cases without wage 
rigidity ( 0=µ ). The IRFs are presented in Figures 2 and 3. 
 
Figure 2 – IRF: A negative technology shock, GHH preferences 
 
 
 
Looking at Figure 2, a negative technology shock induces a reduction in the demand for 
labor. Under GHH preferences, there is no shift of the labor supply curve40, so the amount of 
labor falls. When wages are rigid, they go down very slowly. Thus, the fall in the amount of 
labor is stronger in the case of the wage rigidity, as is the fall in consumption. However, 
despite the stronger fall of consumption, the marginal utility of consumption (λ ) reacts the 
same in the case of the wage rigidity. This is the result of the fall in labor (increase in leisure) 
and the strong substitutability of leisure and consumption in the GHH utility function (that is, 
households are "compensated" for their lower consumption, with more leisure). Since the 
                                                 
40
  Note that this happens because of two offsetting forces: Households would want to work more in 
order to prevent consumption from falling. Yet at the same time, since they consume less, their utility 
of leisure is higher, and therefore they would like to work less. In GHH preferences, these two forces 
exactly offset each other, resulting in the labor supply staying unchanged. 
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marginal utility of consumption (λ ) responds the same41 the equity premium stays here the 
same.  
 
Figure 3 – IRF: A negative technology shock, JR preferences ( 05.0=γ ) 
 
 
 
Looking at Figure 3, the negative technology shock induces a reduction in the demand for 
labor, as in the GHH case. However, Under JR preferences, the substitution effect between 
consumption and leisure is not strong enough to make households choose to consume less 
and work less, as in the GHH case. Here, there is a wealth effect on labor supply—
households would like to increase their labor supply in order to stabilize their marginal utility 
of consumption. For this reason, when 0=µ , labor goes up. In the specific parameter 
values used here, consumption actually rises initially. When 85.0=µ , labor does not go up, 
and hence consumption falls. Notice that demand for investments falls more when wages are 
rigid, to prevent consumption from falling further. This causes the return on equity to fall 
stronger. The fall in consumption resulting from the wage rigidity causes the marginal utility 
of consumption to react stronger in this case, and together with the stronger fall in the return 
on equity, the result is a higher equity premium. In contrast with the GHH case, where 
                                                 
41
 Together with the fact that return on equity responds the same, which is also mainly a result of the 
similar response of λ .    
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households' labor supply did not shift to the right in response to the shock, in this case it 
does. Adding the friction to the adjustment of wages prevents households from increasing 
their labor effort as they would like to. That is, it is the interaction of the wealth effect of 
labor supply and the limitation on the free adjustment of labor, caused by the wage rigidity, 
which generates the increase in the equity premium. 
 
6.3 The role of government demand shocks in reproducing an equity premium  
In the following subsection we shall demonstrate the relative efficiency of the government 
expenditure shock in reproducing the equity premium. This leads us to conclude that other 
shocks, with similar attributes to the government demand shock, that are currently absent 
from our model, might have an important role in reproducing the equity premium. These 
features are likely to be a result of expenditure or wealth shocks, both of which have a 
dominant wealth effect.  
Table 3a presents the contribution of each of the shocks to the total equity premium and 
to the covariances. As was noted, the government shock contributes a relatively small part of 
the equity premium (1.2 percent in the GHH case). However, the equity premium generated 
by this shock is accompanied by a very low covariance of c and eqr (in the GHH case: 0.03 
percent, as opposed to a contribution of 0.76 percent of the technology shock). In a sense, 
this means that the government shock is more "efficient" than the technology shock, since it 
is able to produce a significant equity premium with only a small volatility of consumption.42 
This result comes from the fact that the covariance of h and eqr  is much lower in the 
government shock than in the technology shock, so that the second term in equation 35 does 
not reduce the equity premium as much as in the technology shock, and it may even have a 
positive contribution to the equity premium if the covariance of h and eqr  is negative.  
To see the difference in the effects of the government shock and the technology shock we 
present in Figure 4 the IRF of a one standard deviation of a positive government shock 
(which reduces consumption) in comparison to a one standard deviation of a negative 
technology shock (which reduces consumption as well). The parameters used for the IRF 
calculation are the ones from the GHH results, with a slight difference – for expositional 
purposes, the standard deviation and the persistence of the technology shock were adjusted 
                                                 
42
 Note that )()(),(),( 111111 ++++++ = tteqttteqttteqtt crcrcrCov σσρ  and from the impulses we can see that 
the low covariance between c  and r  is primarily due to low variance of c .    
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such that both shocks would yield a similar IRF for the consumption. This calibration yielded 
a standard deviation of 0.0011 for the technology shock, as opposed to a standard deviation 
of 0.01 for the government shock.  
From Figure 4 it is clear that while both shocks have the same effect on consumption, the 
government shock has a much larger effect on the marginal utility of consumption (λ ). This 
is the result of the difference in the reaction of h : in the case of technology shock the 
amount of labor decreases because of the reduction of firms' labor demand, while in the case 
of government shock there is no change in the demand for labor, and hence its level does not 
fall on impact. Since h does not fall, there is no mitigation of the effect of the fall in 
consumption onλ . Since λ  rises a lot in the government shock case, households choose to 
reduce investments strongly in order to stabilize the marginal utility of consumption, so the 
demand for investment falls harder and with it also the return on equity. So, for a given 
response of consumption, the government shock causes a much bigger response of λ  and of 
eq
r  which enlarges the equity premium. 
Although the contribution of the government shock in our simulations (presented in Table 
3a) is quite low, due to the relatively small standard deviation of government shocks in our 
data, the results show that in the presence of larger government demand shocks, their role 
may be important in explaining the equity premium and the business cycle moments 
observed in the data.43 To demonstrate this, we conduct a grid search as in section 6.1, with 
the difference that we assume a much higher standard deviation of the government shock – 
10 times higher than in the basic calibration.  The results are presented in Tables A.5 and 
A.5a in Appendix A.5. Table A.5 shows that the larger volatility of the government demand 
has a negligible effect on the loss function value in the GHH case. In the JR case, however, 
the effect is substantial. Looking at the results with the optimal value of γ  (which is now 
higher, 0.5) it can be seen that the loss function value decreased significantly to 0.0287 as 
opposed to 0.0733 in the basic case. Note that one of the causes of the improvement is the 
better fit of the volatility of the trade balance to output. This is the outcome of the lower 
value of dφ , which means that the economy is much more open. In essence, once government 
demand shocks are dominant44, there is no need to close the economy so much in order to 
                                                 
43
 For example, Parvar et al. 2012 report a very large standard deviation of the government 
expenditure in Argentina and Brazil (0.113 and 0.123, respectively).  
44
 To see the dominance of the government shock, note in table 5a their high contribution to the 
equity premium. 
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match the equity premium, and hence the dynamics of the trade balance are much closer to 
the data.  
The much improved fit of the model when the standard deviation of the government 
expenditure shock is higher might imply that other shocks, with similar attributes to the 
government demand shock, that are currently absent from our model, have an important role 
in reality. More specifically, shocks whose dominant effect is a reduction in consumption and 
in the return on equity, accompanied by an increase in labor supply, are good candidates. 
These features are likely to be a result of expenditure or wealth shocks that have a dominant 
wealth effect.  
 
Figure 4 – IRF: A positive government shock vs. a negative technology shock,  
GHH preferences 
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6.4 The role of shocks to the international interest rate in reproducing an equity 
premium 
As can be seen in Table 3a the contribution of the international interest rate to the equity 
premium is low. In this subsection we shall explain why.45 Also note that a basic assumption 
in our model (as well as in other standard RBC models of a small open economy) is that the 
real exchange rate is constant. This assumption is quite at odds with reality. In reality, the 
actual return on foreign bonds in domestic terms is influenced by fluctuations in the real 
exchange rate. In subsection 6.4.1 we shall also show that the presence of large real exchange 
rate fluctuations may have an important contribution to the equity premium.    
To assess the low contribution to the equity premium of shocks to the international 
interest rate, we present in Figure 546 the IRF of this shock. A positive shock to the world's 
interest rate has two effects. The first effect of the shock is that it makes lending abroad more 
attractive than investing in domestic capital and hence should reduce the demand for 
investment. However, in the presence of high adjustment costs in changing the debt position, 
as is the case here, households will be averse to changing their debt position in response to 
the shock. Therefore, on impact, the demand for investments does not change, and the return 
on equity stays stable as well.  
A second effect of the shock has to do with the effect on households' income: households 
in the economy are net borrowers from the rest of the world47; thus, a rise in the world's 
interest rate means that households have to pay more on their debt, and thus they reduce 
consumption. In sum, although in response to the shock the marginal utility of consumption 
goes up, the return on equity stays stable (on impact), and this results in a low contribution of 
this shock to the equity premium.    
Note that although investments don't respond to the shock on impact, after the initial 
period, when consumption starts to decline strongly, household have to reduce investments in 
order to prevent consumption from falling even further. The fall in investment is much larger 
than the fall in consumption and output, meaning that the investment volatility induced by 
this shock is much higher than consumption's or output's volatility.  
 
                                                 
45
 Note, however, that its contribution to business cycle properties of the model are quit significant, as 
can be seen by comparing the IRF in figures 5 and 2. 
46
 The IRF was constructed with the parameters of the GHH case.   
47
 This is a result of our calibration, not a general feature of the model. This calibration was chosen 
since in our sample period, the Israeli economy was, on average, a net borrower from abroad (see 
footnote 28). 
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Figure 5 – IRF: A positive shock to the international interest rate, GHH preferences 
 
 
 
6.4.1 An alternative calibration of the world's interest rate dynamics 
In the formulation of our model, we assumed that the domestic good is a perfect substitute 
for the foreign good, so that their prices must be equal. In the following we shall relax this 
assumption but only with regard to capital movements. Our aim is to to show that uncertainty 
with regard to changes in the real exchange rate, might have a large positive affect on the 
equity premium in a small open economy.  
 Till now we assumed that investing in a foreign bond yields fR units of the foreign good 
which is a perfect substitute to the domestic good. We shall now assume that in order to use 
the foreign good in the local economy we need to transfer it to local goods. The yield in 
terms of the domestic good is affected by the change in the relative prices of the domestic 
and foreign goods—i.e., by the change in the real exchange rate. Let te∆ denote the change 
in the (log of the) exchange rate at time t . The yield at period t  in terms of domestic good is  
)1(1 tft eR ∆+− . Note that ftR 1−  , the return in terms of foreign good, is known in advance, but 
the return in terms of the local good is unknown in advance. The yield on foreign bonds in 
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terms of the domestic good is known only when e∆  is realized. This means that the volatility 
of the realized return (in domestic terms) is larger than the volatility of the ex ante return.  
In order to take account of the volatility of the realized returns in terms of the domestic 
good, we first estimate an equation for the process of the real exchange rate of the following 
form48:  
43)     ette ε=∆ .  
The estimate of the standard deviation of etε ( eσ ) is 0.129%, much higher than the standard 
deviation of rtε (0.0137%), reflecting a very high volatility of the real exchange rate.  
In order to incorporate the above equation in the model we slightly modified the basic 
model, to account, in an ad-hoc manner49, for the high volatility of the realized returns of the 
foreign bonds in local terms. Note that equation (43) implies that 0)(1 =∆− tt eE , so that the 
ex ante return in domestic terms is equal to the ex ante return in foreign terms. Hence, the 
process for the ex ante world interest rate stays the same (evolves according to equation 
(15)), but equation (3), describing the evolvement of the economy's debt is slightly changed:  
(3)'     ttetfttttftt TBDRTBDeRD −+=−∆+= −−−− 1111 )1()1( ε  
That is, the debt is affected by the shocks to the real exchange rate as well. 
Table 5 and 5a present the results with the new shock. As can be seen, the results with the 
optimal value of γ (which is now 0.4) in terms of the loss function value are much better: 
0.0218 as opposed to 0.0733 in the basic case. One source for this improvement is the 
standard deviation of the trade balance to output ratio, which inclined from 0.4 in the basic 
case, to 2.7, while in the data the standard deviation is 2.6. A second noticeable source for the 
improvement is higher, closer to data, volatility of consumption.  
In Table 5a it can be seen that the shock to the realized return on bonds has a significant 
contribution to the equity premium. In the optimal case, whereγ = 0.4, it is responsible for 
more than half of the equity premium.  
 
                                                 
48
  A constant term and an autoregressive term were found to be not significantly different from zero. 
49
  It is an ad-hoc manner since in reality, it is likely that e∆  is correlated with the shocks that we 
have in our model. Modeling explicitly the channels that affect the real exchange rate is beyond the 
scope of this paper. Hence, we simply assume here that e∆  evolves according to some exogenous 
process, and check its effect on the world's interest rate in the data. 
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Figure 6 presents the IRF for this shock. Since households are net borrowers from 
abroad50, the rise in the interest rate raises the cost of the debt, thus inducing a negative 
wealth effect on consumption and on labor: consumption actually rises in the first periods, 
but this rise is temporary, and right afterward it falls and stays lower than usual for a 
prolonged period of time. To prevent consumption from falling even further, households 
choose to work more, and labor goes up. Thus, the marginal utility of consumption rises. The 
return on equity goes down because of the fall in investment induced by households' desire to 
prevent consumption from falling further. Notice the similarity of this shock to the 
government demand shock. Both shocks affect directly households' disposable income, thus 
causing consumption and investment to decrease (when the shock is positive), and labor to 
increase. The result of this process is an increase in the marginal utility of consumption 
accompanied by a fall of the return on equity, which generates a positive correlation between 
the two and causes households to demand a positive equity premium.  
To conclude, the presence of large real exchange rate fluctuations may be a potential 
major driver of the business cycle, as well as an important source of the equity premium. 
 
                                                 
50
 It should be noted that although in this specific model shocks to the real exchange rate have a 
contribution to the risk premium only when the foreign debt differs from zero, in reality this 
mechanism does not require the debt to be different than zero: in our model, there is no difference 
between the domestic good and the foreign good, so shocks to the real exchange rate had to be 
accounted for through their effect on the volatility of the interest rates, which has a direct income 
effect on households only because the debt is not zero. In reality, changes in the exchange rate affect 
households' wealth even in the absence of debt. For example, a depreciation of the domestic good 
means that households can't consume as much as before, since the foreign goods are now more 
expensive. Thus, even when there is no debt, real exchange rate fluctuations should be taken into 
account as a (possibly) important contributor to the equity premium. 
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                    Table 5: Business cycle moments and the equity premium,  
Israeli data and the model under Jaimovich-Rebelo utility function, eσ =0.129  
 
 
 
 
γ
 
 (1) 
 
0.0001 
(2) 
 
0. 4 
  
Data 
Israel No EP EP No EP EP 
Standard deviations        
y 2.9 3.0 2.9 3.2 3.3 
c 2.2 3.5 3.5 2.5 2.7 
i 12.3 10.1 9.9 12.7 10.5 
h 2.8 1.7 1.7 1.9 2.2 
tb/y 2.6 2.3 2.6 2.6 2.7 
Serial correlations 
  32.00  32.00 
y 0.61 0.78 0.71 0.53 0.40 
Correlations with output 
     
c 0.51 1.00 0.96 0.98 0.97 
i 0.71 0.47 0.47 0.58 0.49 
h 0.71 0.98 0.98 0.82 0.64 
tb/y 
-0.08 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.30 
Equity premium 
     
EP 9.00 0.43 8.88 0.01 8.92 
ef
r
σ  
 5.06 32.39 0.48 31.18 
SR 
 0.06 0.20 0.01 0.21 
Parameter Values 
     
dθ  
 2.19 307 2.35 299435 
kφ  
 1.5E+00 8.348 3.5E-02 7.539 
ρ  
 -0.67 -0.32 0.36 0.46 
σ  
 0.0038 0.0063 0.0137 0.0185 
Loss function value 
 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 
No EP  0.0781 0.0759 0.0224 0.0435 
EP  0.4919 0.0380 0.5101 0.0218 
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Table 5a: The equity premium and its sources under                                               
Jaimovich-Rebelo preferences, eσ =0.129 
),(),( 11,11 ++++ −= teqtthchteqttcct hrCovcrCovEP ηη  
 
γ
 
(1) 
 
0.0001 
(2) 
 
0.4 
  EP EP 
Total 
    
eta_cc 38.75 22.37 
eta_ch,h 49.85 21.39 
cov(c,r) 0.31 0.39 
cov(h,r) 0.06 0.00 
Equity premium % 8.88 8.92 
 
    
eps 
    
cov(c,r) 0.09 0.44 
cov(h,r) 0.06 0.27 
Equity premium  % 0.48 3.92 
 
    
  
    
epsrw 
    
cov(c,r) 0.0000 -0.0001 
cov(h,r) 0.0000 -0.0001 
Equity premium % -0.0007 -0.0005 
 
    
  
    
epsg 
    
cov(c,r) 0.01 0.00 
cov(h,r) 0.00 -0.01 
Equity premium % 0.22 0.13 
  
   
 
    
Epsrw_lag 
    
cov(c,r) 0.21 -0.04 
cov(h,r) 0.00 -0.26 
Equity premium % 8.19 4.88 
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Figure 6 – IRF: A positive shock to the realized international interest rate, Jaimovich-
Rebelo preferences, γ =0.4, eσ =0.129 
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7. Conclusions 
In this paper we tried to reproduce both the business cycle facts and the equity premium of 
the Israeli economy. For this purpose we used data on the main real business cycle moments 
of the Israeli economy during the period 1960 to 2008, as well as data on the equity returns 
and the risk free bonds returns. We formulated an RBC model for a small open economy 
which included three driving forces of the economy's dynamics: a productivity shock, a 
government expenditure shock, and a world interest rate shock.  
By defining a loss function which consists of the sum of the differences between the 
moments in the data to simulated moments, and trying to minimize it, we checked what 
structure of the economy describes the Israeli economy in the best way.  Specifically, we 
checked what utility function is the most suitable for this purpose and what are the 
quantitative properties of the unobserved features of the economy such as capital and foreign 
debt adjustment costs and the technological shock process.  
Our first finding is that GHH preferences, which are quite common in RBC models of 
small open economies, are not suited to reproduce both the business cycle and the equity 
premium facts of a "typical" small open economy. A typical small open economy, such as 
Israel's, is characterized by a relatively high volatility of investments (compared to output 
and consumption). With GHH preferences the model is not able to yield an equity premium 
close to the data together with a large enough volatility of investments. A main finding of 
this paper is that the use of Jaimovich-Rebelo preferences considerably improves the results 
relative to that achieved by GHH preferences. The reason for this is that the GHH 
preferences are characterized by a relatively high degree of substitutability between 
consumption and leisure and this moderates the volatility of the stochastic discount factor 
(SDF). By adding some degree of wealth effect we can get a significant increase in the 
volatility of the SDF, and hence an increase in the equity premium and in the volatility of 
investment. We also found, that in order to prevent households from freely adjusting their 
labor supply (thus smoothing their marginal utility of consumption over time), we need to 
add to the model some kind of limitations on labor supply (we used both real wage rigidity 
and habits in labor). We further showed that it is the interaction between the limitations on 
labor supply and the wealth effect in the Jaimovich-Rebelo preferences that increases the 
equity premium.  
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Another finding in the paper is that shocks that have a large effect on households' 
expenditure or wealth might play an important role in the presence of the equity premium. 
These kind of shocks cause households to consume less and work more, thus the  marginal 
utility of consumption in the Jaimovich-Rebelo preferences (where consumption and leisure 
are substitutable) changes a lot in response to these shocks, thus yielding a high equity 
premium. One shock of this type is the government demand shock which directly affects 
households' disposable income and hence seemed to have the ability of explaining a 
significant part of the equity premium. However, the magnitude of this shock in the Israeli 
data is not very large, and hence it explains only a small part of the equity premium. A 
second shock that might have similar properties is a shock to the realized return on foreign 
assets. This kind of shock could arise from a shock to the exchange rate, which changes the 
return on foreign assets in terms of the local consumption basket. We have shown that the 
volatility in households' returns due to exchange rate fluctuations is considerable, and it 
significantly helps in fitting the data.  
With the few shocks in our model we are able to get a good fit of the data. Nonetheless, it 
is clear that in reality there may be other shocks, that are absent from our model and have 
similar properties to the aforementioned type of shocks, and they have a contribution to the 
equity premium as well.     
One shortcoming of our results is the excess volatility of the risk free interest rate, 
relative to its volatility in the data. That is, our model does not solve the risk free rate 
volatility puzzle.    
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Appendix 
 
A1.  Log linearization of the F.O.C 
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A.2 Asset pricing 
Let )ln( tt Xx = be normally distributed, then: 
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The F.O.C for capital, equation (8) above can be written as: 
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. Taking logarithms and assuming that 1+tR  and 1+tM are log-normally 
distributed we obtain:  
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The above equation can also be written as follows: 
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For a risk free asset the return )( 1ftr +  is known at time t . Using this in the asset pricing 
equation 3'') and using the fact that  0)( 1 =+ftt rVar  and 0),( 11 =++ tftt mrCov , we have that the 
pricing equation for the risk free rate is: 
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Using 4) and 3'') we get the following expression for the equity premium:  
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Using this in 5) we get: 
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To ease the calculation of the EP and SR from the outcomes of log-linearized DSGE model, 
note that for each variable 1+tX : 
)ln(ln)(ln 011 XXVarXVar tttt −= ++  etc. , where: 0X  is the steady value of X .  
 
A3. The equity premium and Sharpe ratio in terms of the elasticity's of the marginal 
utility: 
Log linearization of the F.O.C (6) and (7) above yields: 
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For the equity premium, and for the sharpe ratio we get:  
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A4. Utility specification and its derivatives  
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A similar calculations leads for the following expression for the second derivative (with 
respect to consumption) of lifetime utility:   
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Using the above we have: 
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Where:  0
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It can be easily seen that for the case 0=γ  we get the relevant elasticity of the GHH utility 
(equation (2.6) above) and for the case 1=γ  we get the relevant elasticity of the KPR utility 
(equation (3.6)).  
 
Now we continue to calculate the cross derivative
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The second derivative with respect to tH is: 
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And the relevant elasticity is:  
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A.5 Illustrating the potential role of Government expenditure shock   
 
Table A5: Business cycle moments and the equity premium,  
Israeli data and the model under Jaimovich-Rebelo utility function, with Gσ *10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
γ
 
 (1) 
 
0.0001 
(2) 
 
0. 5 
  
Data 
Israel No EP EP No EP EP 
Standard deviations        
y 2.9 2.3 2.5 3.0 3.0 
c 2.2  3.8 4.2 2.9 2.9 
i 12.3 3.7 4.4 10.8 8.8 
h 2.8 1.4 1.5 1.6 2.3 
tb/y 2.6  4.2 3.8 2.5 2.0 
Serial correlations 
     
y 0.61 0.6 0.64 0.6 0.56 
Correlations with output 
     
c 0.51 0.73 0.70 0.9 0.76 
i 0.71 0.78 0.83 0.5 0.28 
h 0.71 0.97 0.98 0.6 0.56 
tb/y 
-0.08 0.07 0.04 0.1 0.15 
Equity premium 
     
EP 9.00 2.17 8.91 1.1 8.92 
ef
r
σ  
 3.99 10.80 5.3 20.35 
SR 
 0.16 0.30 0.1 0.25 
Parameter Values 
     
dθ  
 0.16 0.83 1.0 5.99 
kφ  
 1.3E+02 92.16 2.9 10.68 
ρ  
 0.08 -0.38 0.4 0.58 
σ  
 0.0071 0.0056 0.0 0.0140 
Loss function value 
 32 32.0000 32.0 32.0000 
No EP  0.1951 0.2054 0.048 0.0574 
EP   0.3855 0.1027 0.414 0.0287 
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Table A5a: The equity premium and its sources under Jaimovich-Rebelo  
preferences, Gσ *10 
),(),( 11,11 ++++ −= teqtthchteqttcct hrCovcrCovEP ηη  
 
 
γ
 
(1) 
 
0.0001 
  (2) 
 
           0. 5 
  
       EP EP 
Total 
     
eta_cc 38.75 18.99  
eta_ch,h 49.85 18.68 
cov(c,r) 0.25 0.37 
cov(h,r) 0.02 -0.09 
Equity premium % 8.91 8.92 
 
   
eps 
   
cov(c,r) 0.03 0.22 
cov(h,r) 0.02 0.15 
Equity premium  % 0.06 1.52 
 
   
  
   
epsrw 
   
cov(c,r) 0.0068 0.0011 
cov(h,r) -0.0001 -0.0003 
Equity premium % 0.2703 0.0240 
 
   
  
   
epsg 
   
cov(c,r) 0.22 0.15 
cov(h,r) 0.00 -0.24 
Equity premium % 8.58 7.38 
    
 
 
    
 
 
A.6 The grid search for optimal parameter values  
In order to find the optimal parameter values of { ρ ,σ , kφ , dθ } we defined the following 
loss function :51  
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51
 A somewhat similar methodology was used by Jermann 1998, Uhlig 2006 and Parver et al. 2012. 
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Where z is a binary variable getting the value 0, when we consider only the business cycle 
moments, and 9 when we want to match the equity premium as well. The value 9 was chosen 
in order to give equal weights to the business cycle side and the asset pricing side of the 
model. As can be seen, the loss function is normalized by the factor (9+z).  
Once we have defined the loss function, we want to find the parameter values that 
minimize it. For this, we use the "fminsearch" procedure of MATLAB, which gets as an 
input an initial value and returns a value that is a local minimum of the function. A potential 
problem with this procedure is that in many cases the local minimum is not the global one. 
To deal with this potential problem we proceeded in the following way: we conducted a grid 
search on the four parameters. For each parameter we chose a range of values to search over, 
and the size of the jump between the different values. This defines for each parameter a list 
of values to be searched over. Then we constructed a set comprised of all of the different 
combinations of these parameter values. i.e., we constructed a large list of grid points, each 
of them defined by the value of the four parameters. After constructing a list of grid points, 
we used each of them as an initial value for the "fminsearch" procedure. For each grid point 
we ran the minimization procedure and saved the value it returned. At the end of the process 
we found the parameter values that returned the lowest value of the loss function and used 
them as the optimal ones.  
In theory, we would like to check a very large amount of grid points in order to 
thoroughly cover the whole array of possibilities. In practice, however, this process is very 
time consuming. Therefore, we chose the parameter range that seemed to give the best results 
in terms of this trade off between accuracy and efficiency. It seems that the combination of 
using the minimization procedure of MATLAB together with the grid search is an 
improvement in this aspect, relative to using each of these schemes by its own mean.  
 
